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ABSTRACT
The government plays increasingly active and diversified roles in the
modern economy. How to draw the boundary between the market and the state
has emerged as a contentious issue in various areas of law, including
constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade. This Article surveys and
critiques the law’s current approaches to the market-versus-state divide,
embodied in four tests based on ownership, control, function, and role,
respectively. This Article proposes an alternative market-versus-state test
based on the nature of the power being exercised in the challenged action. This
power-based test not only better distinguishes between the market and the
state, but also illuminates why the market-versus-state distinction needs to be
made in the first place. Applying this power-based test would bring much
needed logic and clarity to many market-versus-state issues in various legal
contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
The government is on the march. Having grown out of the pre- progressive
mode of governance where all commercial disputes were resolved through
private litigation, the tentacles of the government are reaching far and wide,
extending regulatory oversight over a plethora of social and economic
activities, including competition, railroad pricing, food and drug safety, and
many others.1 Supported by a rapidly growing number of regulatory agencies,
the government has assumed greater control over the economy, expanding its
role from correcting market failures to administering social and economic
justice.2
Aside from its traditional role as a market regulator, the government is also
emerging as a major participant in market activities. Among other things,
governments own corporations,3 employ workers,4 and buy large amounts of
goods and services.5 The footprint of the government has grown larger
particularly because of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, which sparked
unprecedented state intervention in the marketplace.6
The rise of the government is even more dramatic if one’s horizon is
broadened to include emerging economies on the world stage. Powerful stateowned enterprises from countries like China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are
1
Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. LITERATURE
401, 401 (2003).
2
See Karen Yeung, The Regulatory State, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 72–73 (Robert
Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).
3
State-owned corporations are common even in Western countries. For a history of state-owned
enterprises in Western countries, see Pier Angelo Toninelli, The Rise and Fall of Public Enterprise: The
Framework, in THE RISE AND FALL OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 3 (Pier Angelo
Toninelli ed., 2000).
4
In the United States, the federal government is the largest employer in the nation, with more than 2.1
million civilian workers and 1.3 million active duty military who serve in all fifty states and around the world.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 75
(2015).
5
For example, “[t]he U.S. [federal] government is the largest single purchaser of goods and services in
the world, awarding approximately $500 billion in contracts every year.” SBA’s Role in Government
Contracting, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/contracting/what-government-contracting/sbasrole-government-contracting (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
6
In the wake of the global financial crisis, the U.S. government seized control of American
International Group, one of the world’s largest insurers, to prevent the company from falling into bankruptcy.
See Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as
Credit Dries Up, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB122156561931242905?mg=prod/accounts-wsj. The U.S. government also took 60% ownership of General
Motors as part of the latter’s government-orchestrated bankruptcy process. See Neil King Jr. & Sharon Terlep,
GM Collapses Into Government’s Arms, WALL ST. J. (June 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB124385428627671889.
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ushering in a new form of doing business, generally dubbed as “state
capitalism.”7 As one indication of the ascendancy of state capitalism, the
thirteen biggest oil firms in the world, which control more than three-quarters
of the world’s oil reserves, are all state-backed.8 The government has been so
successful in the new era of capitalism that one influential commentator has
pronounced “the end of the free market.”9
The changing dynamics between the government and the market have farreaching implications not just for the economy, but for the law as well. Courts
and dispute settlement tribunals around the world are grappling with the
increasingly active and diversified roles of the government. Since 2007, the
U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on whether the government could require waste
hauling firms to bring waste to publicly owned waste transfer and processing
facilities,10 whether a state-owned hospital should be required to answer
antitrust complaints when it attempted to acquire the only competing hospital
in the region,11 and whether a state dental licensing board should be accorded
immunity from antitrust law when it prohibited nondental practitioners from
providing teeth-whitening services.12 In the meantime, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) opined on whether Chinese state-owned enterprises
should be treated as public bodies akin to government agencies13 and whether a
Canadian provincial government provided a subsidy to renewable energy
producers when it purchased electricity from them at above-market rates.14

7

See The Visible Hand, ECONOMIST (Jan. 21, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21542931.
Id.
9
IAN BREMMER, THE END OF THE FREE MARKET: WHO WINS THE WAR BETWEEN STATES AND
CORPORATIONS? (2010).
10
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (holding
that county ordinances mandating the delivery of waste to designated waste transfer and processing facilities
did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
11
Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216 (2013) (holding that a state
hospital authority is not entitled to state-action immunity in its acquisition of existing hospitals).
12
N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (holding that a
dental licensing board is not eligible for state-action immunity because its action was not actively supervised
by the state).
13
Panel Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China, ¶ 7.75,
WTO Doc. WT/DS437/R (adopted July 14, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 Panel Report] (holding that the United
States acted inconsistently with its WTO obligations when it found that Chinese SOEs were public bodies
based only on the grounds that they were majority owned or controlled by the Chinese government).
14
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation
Sector/Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R,
WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 6, 2013) [hereinafter DS412/DS426 AB Report] (holding that it was unable to
determine whether Ontario’s feed-in-tariff program conferred a benefit because the relevant market for the
benefit analysis should be the separate competitive markets for wind- and solar-generated electricity).
8
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This Article is an attempt to systematically examine how the government
interacts with the market and how the law treats such interactions. For ease of
reference, this Article labels the various issues arising from the governmentmarket interactions as “market-versus-state”15 issues. While the market-versusstate dynamics have shifted in leaps and bounds, legal scholarship has not kept
up with the changes. Scholarly discussions of the market-versus-state divide
date mostly back to several decades ago, when the state was still playing a
static, confined role in the economy.16 And the existing academic literature
approaches market-versus-state issues in isolated manners, paying essentially
no attention to the systemic implications of the different ways of handling
market-versus-state issues in different areas of law.17
This Article sets out to narrow the gap in understanding how the law
should deal with market-versus-state interactions. It starts with a survey of how
market-versus-state interactions are being treated in three distinct areas of law:
constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade.18 This Article discusses
how the law in those areas employs four tests, based on ownership, control,
function, and role, respectively, to draw the boundary between the market and
the state. These tests, however, suffer serious limitations. They either presume
that all conduct by the government is governmental in nature, or base legal
outcomes on factors that do not lend themselves to objective determinations.

15
Unless otherwise noted, the term “state” in this Article refers to the government in the abstract sense,
not any particular political division or subdivision.
16
See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 88 MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989) (discussing the market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause in U.S. constitutional law); Einer Richard Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. REV.
667 (1991) (proposing a process view of the antitrust state action doctrine); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States
from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377
(1996) (proposing an antidistortion standard for determining whether a state tax incentive violates the
Commerce Clause); Mark P. Gergen, The Selfish State and the Market, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (1988)
(discussing principles for differentiating between permissible and impermissible state preferences for its own
citizens); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Business Development
Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996) (discussing the tax-subsidy distinction in Commerce Clause
jurisprudence); Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential
Economic Federalism, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 227 (1987) (discussing the state action doctrine in antitrust law and
its relationship to economic federalism); Michael Wells & Walter Hellerstein, The Governmental-Proprietary
Distinction in Constitutional Law, 66 VA. L. REV. 1073 (1980) (discussing the governmental-proprietary
distinction in various constitutional law contexts).
17
Constitutional law scholars, for example, have not drawn connections between various marketversus-state issues in constitutional law with their counterparts in other areas of law. See, e.g., Hellerstein &
Coenen, supra note 16 (discussing the tax-subsidy distinction in Commerce Clause jurisprudence but not
whether and how such a distinction is made in international trade law).
18
See infra Part I.
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Alternatively, they are implicitly predicated on a value judgment that needs
support on a case-by-case basis.19
This Article contends that a more reliable way of distinguishing between
the market and the state is to look at the nature of the power being exercised in
the challenged action. If the power is a coercive one, backed up by statesanctioned violence with no recognized basis in property rights, then the state
is exercising governmental power and is acting in a governmental capacity.
But if the state exercises coercive power by virtue of its control of economic
resources, then it is exercising market power that could have been exercised by
private actors, and therefore is acting in a proprietary or market capacity. 20
This power-based test, coupled with an inquiry as to the fundamental purpose
of the legal regime at issue, not only better distinguishes between the market
and the state, but also illuminates why the market-versus-state distinction
needs to be made in the first place.21 This Article argues that applying this
power-based test would bring much needed logic and clarity to many marketversus-state issues in constitutional law, antitrust, and international trade.22
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the major
market-versus-state issues that have come up in the law. Part II discusses the
law’s current approaches to the market-versus-state divide, embodied in four
tests based on ownership, control, function, and role, respectively. Part III
proposes an alternative market-versus-state test based on power and an
analytical framework within which the power-based test will be situated. Part
IV discusses the application of the power-based test in various legal contexts.
I.

THE MARKET VERSUS THE STATE: THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

The interaction between the market and the state figures prominently in
many areas of law, including constitutional law, antitrust, and international
trade. In those areas of law, the legal consequences of an action by the state
often depend on whether the state acts in a governmental or proprietary
capacity, whether the individual or entity carrying out the disputed action is
considered to be acting in a public or private capacity, and whether state
participation in the market is considered to distort the market. In this Part, this
Article surveys the legal treatment of these market-versus-state interactions.
This survey revolves around three major legal issues that play prominent roles
19
20
21
22

See infra Part II.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part IV.
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in constitutional law, antitrust law, and international trade law: the
governmental-proprietary distinction, the public-private distinction, and market
distortion by the state. The following discussions illustrate how important the
market-versus-state distinction has become and, in some cases, how detached
the distinction has grown from the actual purpose of the law.
A. The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction
The governmental-proprietary distinction is a “cluster of rules” used by
courts to distinguish the state’s core governmental functions from its
proprietary or market activities in a variety of contexts.23 This distinction
queries whether the state acts in a governmental or proprietary capacity, with
divergent legal consequences flowing from that designation. This distinction is
utilized in diverse legal contexts, ranging from constitutional law to antitrust
law.
1. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution stipulates that “Congress
shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”24
Courts have interpreted this positive grant of legislative power to Congress as
carrying a negative, or dormant, implication that states are prohibited from
discriminating against or otherwise burdening interstate commerce.25 When the
state is considered to be acting as a participant in proprietary or market
activities, however, courts have held such actions immune from dormant
Commerce Clause challenges.26
The Supreme Court first laid out this market-participant exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause in the seminal case of Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., which involved a Maryland program that imposed stricter
documentation requirements for out-of-state scrap processors than for in-state
scrap processors for receiving state subsidies for destroying abandoned
automobiles.27 The Court upheld the Maryland program because “[n]othing in
23

Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 1075.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
25
See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997). For an overview of the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, see Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 47–60 (1988).
26
For background on this “market-participant” or “proprietary-activities” exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause, see Gergen, supra note 16, at 1139–43.
27
426 U.S. 794 (1976). The lower court found the Maryland program unconstitutional, citing its
“substantial burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce.” See Alexandria Scrap Corp. v. Hughes, 391
24
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the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence
of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others.”28
After Alexandria Scrap, the Court extended the market-participant
exception to two other scenarios. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the Court upheld a
South Dakota policy of limiting sales of cement produced by a state-owned
plant to state residents in times of cement shortage.29 In White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., the Court rejected a
Commerce Clause challenge to an executive order of the mayor of Boston
requiring all city-funded construction projects be performed by a work force at
least half of which were bona fide city residents.30 In both cases, the Court
affirmed “[t]he basic distinction drawn in Alexandria Scrap between States as
market participants and States as market regulators.”31
In three other cases, however, the Supreme Court limited the scope of the
market-participant exception. In South Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke, the Court took up the question of whether the market-participant
exception would exempt from Commerce Clause scrutiny an Alaska
requirement that timber taken from state lands be processed within the state
prior to export.32 The Court answered the question in the negative, holding that
“the State may not avail itself of the market-participant doctrine to immunize
its downstream regulation of the timber-processing market in which it [was]
not a participant.”33 In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Court again
declined to apply the market-participant exception.34 In that case, the Court
struck down an Ohio statute that provided tax credit for ethanol producers from
Ohio or from states that granted reciprocal tax credit, exemption, or refund for
Ohio-produced ethanol.35 The Court argued that the market-participant
exception was inapplicable because “the Ohio action . . . at issue [was] neither
its purchase nor its sale of ethanol, but its assessment and computation of

F. Supp. 46, 62 (D. Md. 1975), rev’d, 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Supreme Court, however, distinguished the
instant case from previous dormant Commerce Clause cases, arguing that Maryland in this case was merely
acting as “a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article of interstate commerce.” Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at
808.
28
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 810.
29
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
30
460 U.S. 204 (1983).
31
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436; White, 460 U.S. at 207 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436).
32
467 U.S. 82 (1984).
33
Id. at 99.
34
486 U.S. 269 (1988).
35
Id. at 271, 280.
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taxes—a primeval governmental activity.”36 Finally, in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court once again held that
a preferential state tax exemption did not qualify for immunity under the
market-participant exception.37
2. Positive Commerce Clause
The governmental-proprietary distinction also matters when it comes to the
positive commerce power. In National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme
Court struck down the application of the Fair Labor Standard Act’s minimum
wages and maximum hours provisions to local and state government “insofar
as [they] operate to directly displace the States’ freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”38 According to the
Court, the exercise of congressional authorities in those areas would impair the
states’ ability to function effectively in a federal system, and therefore was not
within the authority granted by the Commerce Clause.39
A decade later, however, the Court repudiated the governmentalproprietary distinction it made in National League of Cities. In Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court held that the defendant, a
municipally owned and operated mass-transit system, was not immune from
the minimum-wage and overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, despite that it provided a traditional governmental function.40 In a broad
ruling, the Court declared that “the attempt to draw the boundaries of state
regulatory immunity in terms of ‘traditional governmental function’ is not only
unworkable but is also inconsistent with established principles of
federalism.”41 Instead, the Court held, “[T]he principal means chosen by the
Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the
structure of the Federal Government itself.”42

36

Id. at 277.
520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997) (“A tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in the market
that falls within the market-participation doctrine.”).
38
426 U.S. 833, 836, 852 (1976).
39
Id. at 852.
40
469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985).
41
Id. at 531.
42
Id. at 550. The Court implied, however, that a constitutional challenge might remain open if “the
internal safeguards of the political process have [not] performed as intended.” Id. at 556.
37
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3. Antitrust
The governmental-proprietary distinction also plays a potential role in
antitrust law under the so-called state-action immunity or exemption. Hailed as
the “Magna Carta of free enterprise,”43 antitrust law promotes competition and
consumer welfare through prohibitions of restraints of trade.44 Certain
restraints of trade, however, are exempted from antitrust liability if they are
imposed by the state. In Parker v. Brown, the Supreme Court held that a raisin
marketing program approved by producers under the California Agricultural
Prorate Act did not constitute an illegal restraint of trade within the meaning of
the Sherman Act since the restraint was imposed by the state “as an act of
government.”45
Under the case law, however, a question lingers as to whether the Parker
state-action immunity extends to the state’s proprietary activities. The seed of
uncertainty was planted in Parker itself. While recognizing the state’s power to
impose a restraint of trade “as sovereign,”46 the Court in Parker made it clear
that it was not dealing with the “question of the state or its municipality
becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade.”47 Later, in City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., the Court interpreted this language to mean that the state-action immunity
“does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory capacity
but as a commercial participant in a given market.”48
However, the Court has not explicitly opined on whether the state-action
immunity recognizes an exception for market or proprietary activities. Most

43

United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
See Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and Future of American Antitrust Policy, 75 CALIF.
L. REV. 797, 798 (1987) (“Antitrust law is a pro-competition policy. The economic goal of such a policy is to
promote consumer welfare through the efficient use and allocation of resources, the development of new and
improved products, and the introduction of new production, distribution, and organizational techniques for
putting economic resources to beneficial use.”). But see Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate
Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001) (arguing that the ultimate goal of antitrust law is to promote
consumer choice); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Antitrust Constitution, 99 IOWA L. REV. 57 (2013) (arguing that
antitrust law serves a constitutional function of preventing the assertion of control over the conduct of others
outside the sphere of one’s own property interests).
45
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 344, 352 (1943) (“The state in adopting and enforcing the prorate
program made no contract or agreement and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish
monopoly but, as sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government . . . .”).
46
Id. at 352.
47
Id. at 351–52.
48
499 U.S. 365, 374–75 (1991). The Court later interpreted this statement to be “leaving open the
possibility of a market participant exception” to state-action immunity. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoebe Putney
Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 226 n.4 (2013).
44
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recently, in Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc.,
the Federal Trade Commission challenged a county hospital authority’s
acquisition of an existing hospital in the county as anticompetitive.49 The Court
raised the question of whether there should be a market-participant exception
to the state-action immunity, but did not answer it.50 Instead, the Court relied
on an alternative ground in holding that the county hospital authority was not
eligible for the state-action immunity.51
B. The Public-Private Distinction
Besides the governmental-proprietary distinction, courts often utilize a
public-private distinction when approaching the market-versus-state divide in
various areas of law. Although the exact form of the public-private distinction
varies from context to context, the distinction generally inquires whether the
beneficiary of the disputed action or the individual or entity carrying out the
disputed action should be classified as public or private. Such distinction leads
to the application of different legal standards in constitutional law, antitrust,
and international trade, to name just a few examples.
1. Dormant Commerce Clause
The public-private distinction figures prominently in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on the dormant Commerce Clause. Over the years, the Court has
developed a two-tiered analytical framework to determine whether a state
statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause. When a state statute
discriminates against interstate commerce, either on its face or in its effect,
courts apply strict scrutiny and hold the statute virtually per se invalid.52 By

49
See 568 U.S. at 221–22. The proposed transaction would have allowed the county hospital authority
to control 86% of the market for acute-care hospital services provided to commercial health care plans and
their customers. Id.
50
The Court did not consider this question in its opinion because “this argument was not raised by the
parties or passed on by the lower courts.” Id. at 226 n.4.
51
The Court applied the “clear-articulation” test under California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), and concluded that the county hospital authority was not eligible
for state-action immunity because “there is no evidence the State affirmatively contemplated that hospital
authorities would displace competition by consolidating hospital ownership.” Id. at 226.
52
See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding that a surge
Oregon imposed on in-state disposal of waste generated in other states was facially invalid under the dormant
Commerce Clause); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that a New Jersey
statute prohibiting the importation of solid or liquid waste that originated outside the territorial limits of the
state violated the dormant Commerce Clause); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)
(holding that a city ordinance prohibiting the sale of milk unless bottled within five miles from the center of
the city unduly burdened interstate commerce).
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contrast, an even-handed state statute with only incidental effects on interstate
commerce is outlawed only if its burden on interstate commerce is determined
to clearly exceed its local benefits, under what has become known as the Pike
balancing test.53
In a line of cases dealing with local flow-control laws, the Court has
distinguished between public and private beneficiaries of a disputed state
action in applying this two-tiered analytical framework. In C & A Carbone,
Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, the Court invalidated a town’s flow-control
ordinance requiring all solid waste within the town to be deposited at a
privately operated transfer station.54 The town guaranteed a minimum waste
flow to the transfer station as a way of financing the cost of the transfer station,
which was to be sold to the town in five years for one dollar.55 The Court
struck down the ordinance as “[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in
favor of local business or investment.”56 However, in a subsequent case,
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority,
the Court considered the constitutionality of several counties’ flow-control
ordinances requiring businesses hauling waste in the counties to bring waste to
waste transfer and processing facilities owned and operated by a public benefit
corporation.57 The Court concluded that the challenged ordinances did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because they “benefit[ed] a clearly
public facility, while treating all private companies exactly the same.”58
According to the Court, laws favoring public entities should be analyzed under
the more deferential Pike balancing test and the laws at dispute in this case
passed that test.59

53
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 458, 472 (1981) (holding that a
Minnesota statute “banning the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but
permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard milk cartons” did not
violate the dormant Commerce Clause because its incidental burden on interstate commerce was not clearly
excessive in relation to its putative local benefits); Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981)
(holding that an Iowa statute barring the use of trucks longer than sixty feet on Iowa’s interstate highways
substantially burdened interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (holding that an Arizona order prohibiting a fruit grower from transporting
uncrated cantaloupes from its Arizona ranch to a nearby California city for packing and processing constituted
an unlawful burden on interstate commerce).
54
511 U.S. 383 (1994).
55
Id. at 387.
56
Id. at 392.
57
550 U.S. 330 (2007).
58
Id. at 342.
59
Id. at 346. The Court upheld the laws because they had no “disparate impact on out-of-state as
opposed to in-state businesses.” Id. The Court also suggested that the laws in dispute should survive
Commerce Clause challenges because they carried out a traditional governmental function. Id. at 344 (“We
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2. Antitrust
The public-private distinction also plays an important role in the stateaction immunity in antitrust law, where different legal standards apply
depending on whether the individual or entity carrying out the disputed action
is classified as public or private.
In Parker, the Supreme Court declared that “[w]e find nothing in the
language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature.”60 The Court later clarified that the Parker immunity automatically
applies when the anticompetitive conduct is by the state itself through the state
legislature or the state supreme court.61
When a private entity seeks the state-action immunity, however, the Court
requires the private entity to show that its conduct was pursuant to a “clearly
articulated” state policy and that it was “actively supervised” by the state in
carrying out the challenged conduct.62 Applying this two-pronged test, the
Court in California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.
invalidated a California statute requiring wholesale wine producers to file
resale price schedules with the state.63 The Court concluded that although the
California wine pricing system satisfied the “clear articulation” requirement, it
did not meet the “active state supervision” requirement because “[t]he State
simply authorize[d] price setting and enforce[d] the prices established by
private parties.”64 Most recently, in North Carolina State Board of Dental
Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, the Court denied state-action
immunity to certain anticompetitive conduct by the North Carolina State Board
of Dental Examiners on grounds that the board was comprised of active market
participants and carried out the conduct with no active supervision by the
state.65
should be particularly hesitant to interfere with the Counties’ efforts under the guise of the Commerce Clause
because ‘[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local government function.’” (citation omitted)).
60
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350–51 (1943).
61
See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567–68 (1984) (“Thus, under the Court’s rationale in
Parker, when a state legislature adopts legislation, its actions constitute those of the State, and ipso facto are
exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.” (citation omitted)); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
359–60 (1977) (holding that the state bar of Arizona automatically received Parker immunity because the
anticompetitive conduct was pursuant to the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court).
62
Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980) (quoting City of
Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)).
63
Id. at 105–06.
64
Id. at 105.
65
See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116–17 (2015).
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3. International Trade
The public-private distinction is also made in international trade law in
identifying and measuring subsidies. By way of background, Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) authorizes contracting states
to impose extra tariffs—known as “countervailing duties”—on imports to
offset certain subsidies conferred upon the imports when the imports cause or
threaten to cause material injury to the importing country’s domestic
industries.66 Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures (“SCM Agreement”), for a subsidy to be actionable within the WTO
framework, it must be a “financial contribution by a government or any public
body.”67 If the entity accused of giving a subsidy is a private body, the
investigating authority must demonstrate that a government “entrusts or
directs” the private body to carry out the subsidy-giving activity.68
The question, however, is whether state-owned entities—either stateowned enterprises (SOEs) or state-owned commercial banks—should be
considered public or private bodies for purposes of subsidy identification. The
policy dilemmas surrounding this question are obvious. On one hand, SOEs or
state-owned commercial banks may be operated in the same manner as private
businesses.69 But on the other hand, they may pursue governmental goals,
making their conduct more akin to that of a government.70
The classification of SOEs or state-owned commercial banks as public
bodies has been extensively debated and litigated following the initiation of
countervailing duty investigations by the United States into imports from
China.71 The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), the agency responsible

66
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, art. VI, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 190 [hereinafter GATT 1994].
67
See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, art. 1.1(a)(1), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement]. The subsidy must also confer a benefit on the recipient and be “specific to an enterprise or
industry or a group of enterprises or industries.” Id. at arts. 1.1(b), 2.1.
68
Id. at art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv).
69
See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
70
“[A] principal justification for the existence of SOEs is to accomplish [governmental objectives, or]
objectives that, due to market failure, would otherwise be impossible.” See Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong
Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 681 (2015).
71
The United States started investigating subsidies conferred on imports from China in 2007, in a
reversal of its long-standing policy of not imposing countervailing duties on imports from what it considered
to be “non-market economies.” See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia & Lawrence Norton, Office of
Policy, Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y, Imp. Admin., Countervailing Duty Investigation
of Coated Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China–Whether the Analytical Elements of the
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for countervailing duty investigations in the United States, initially took a
formalistic approach, treating all Chinese SOEs and state-owned commercial
banks as public bodies.72 A WTO dispute settlement panel upheld this
approach in a WTO dispute settlement proceeding, DS379.73 On appeal, the
WTO Appellate Body74 agreed with the panel’s finding in DS379 as to the
Chinese state-owned commercial banks,75 but rejected its finding as to the
Chinese SOEs.76 In another dispute settlement proceeding, DS437, a dispute

Georgetown Steel Opinion are Applicable to China’s Present-Day Economy (Mar. 29, 2007),
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf.
72
In Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from People’s Republic of China in 2008, the USDOC
investigated certain Chinese state-owned steel producers for allegedly providing subsidies to downstream steel
pipe and tube producers by selling steel products to them for less than adequate remuneration. See
Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner,
Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Determination in the
Countervailing Duty Investigation of Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of
China 8–9 (June 13, 2008) [hereinafter China Light-Walled RPT I&D Memo], http://enforcement.trade.gov/
frn/summary/prc/E8-14250-1.pdf. The USDOC adopted a “majority ownership” rule, under which any SOEs
that were majority owned by the Chinese government were considered public bodies. See id. at 29. In Coated
Free Sheet Paper from the People’s Republic of China in 2007, the USDOC similarly treated Chinese stateowned commercial banks as public bodies, on grounds that the Chinese government maintained near complete
ownership of the banking sector in China and exercised extensive control and influences over the operations of
the state-owned commercial banks. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for
Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Issues and Decision
Memorandum on the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty Investigation of Coated Free Sheet Paper
from the People’s Republic of China 55–61 (Oct. 17, 2007) [hereinafter China CFS Paper I&D Memo],
http://enforcement.trade.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E7-21046-1.pdf.
73
See Panel Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain
Products from China, ¶¶ 8.138, 8.143, WT/DS379/R (adopted Oct. 22, 2010) [hereinafter DS379 Panel
Report].
74
The WTO Appellate Body is “a standing body of seven persons that hears appeals from reports
issued by panels in disputes brought by WTO Members. . . . [O]nce adopted by the [WTO] Dispute Settlement
Body, [Appellate Body] reports must be accepted by the parties to the dispute.” See Dispute Settlement:
Appellate Body, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/appellate_body_e.htm
(last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
75
The Appellate Body noted that the USDOC considered “extensive evidence relating to the
relationship between the [state owned commercial banks] and the Chinese Government, including evidence
that the [state owned commercial banks] are meaningfully controlled by the government in the exercise of their
functions.” See Appellate Body Report, United States–Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on
Certain Products from China, ¶ 355, WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 11, 2011) [hereinafter DS379 AB
Report]. The Appellate Body concluded that “these considerations, taken together, demonstrate that the
USDOC’s public body determination in respect of [state owned commercial banks] was supported by evidence
on the record that these [state owned commercial banks] exercise governmental functions on behalf of the
Chinese Government.” Id.
76
The Appellate Body found that the USDOC’s reliance on government ownership was not sufficient
because “evidence of government ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful control of an entity by
government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that the entity is vested with authority
to perform a governmental function.” Id. at ¶ 346.
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settlement panel again rejected the practice of treating all Chinese SOEs as
public bodies. 77
C. Market Distortion by the State
Besides the governmental-proprietary distinction and the public-private
distinction, another market-state interaction that has intrigued the law,
primarily international trade law, is how the presence of the government in the
market affects the integrity of the market. Under GATT Article VI, an
importing country is allowed only to impose countervailing duties not in
excess of an amount equal to the estimated subsidy.78 The SCM Agreement
requires that the amount of the subsidy be calculated by comparing the
treatment the subsidy recipient receives from the government to the treatment
the subsidy recipient would receive or could have received on the private
market.79 The WTO Appellate Body has interpreted this requirement to
embody a market benchmark—a benchmark that identifies and measures a
subsidy by determining “whether the recipient has received a ‘financial
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in
the market.”80
One question arising from the use of market benchmarks for subsidies is
what to do with markets that are substantially influenced by the government. In
United States–Final Countervailing Duty Determination With Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, the Appellate Body addressed
whether the United States could reject private stumpage prices in Canada as a
benchmark for measuring the subsidies Canada allegedly conferred upon
softwood lumber producers through below-market stumpage rates.81 The

77
The Panel concluded that the USDOC acted inconsistently with Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM
Agreement when it found that Chinese SOEs were public bodies “based solely on the grounds that these
enterprises were (majority) owned, or otherwise controlled, by the Government of China.” See DS437 Panel
Report, supra note 13, ¶ 7.75.
78
GATT 1994, supra note 66, art. VI:3.
79
Article 14 of the SCM Agreement provides guidelines on how to calculate the amount of a subsidy in
four scenarios, involving the government provision of equity capital, government-provided loans, governmentprovided loan guarantees, and the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government. SCM
Agreement, supra note 67, at art. 14. In each of the scenarios, Article 14 requires a comparison between the
government subsidized outcome and the market outcome. Id.
80
Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶ 157,
WT/DS70/AB/R (adopted Aug. 2, 1999). For a discussion of the embrace of market benchmarks under the
SCM Agreement, see Wentong Zheng, The Pitfalls of the (Perfect) Market Benchmark: The Case of
Countervailing Duty Law, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–18 (2010).
81
Appellate Body Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to
Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, ¶ 45(b), WT/DS257/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2004).
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Appellate Body held that an investigating authority “may use a benchmark
other than private prices in the country of provision . . . if it is first established
that private prices in that country are distorted because of the government’s
predominant role in providing those goods.”82 After the Appellate Body
recognized the possibility of using benchmarks other than in-country private
market prices, the United States rejected private market prices for loans,
inputs, and lands in China as subsidy benchmarks in several countervailing
duty investigations involving imports from China, on grounds that such incountry private market prices were distorted by the Chinese government.83
China challenged the USDOC’s market-distortion analysis before the
WTO. In DS379, the Appellate Body sided with the USDOC and upheld its
market-distortion analysis for Chinese input subsidies.84 The Appellate Body
reasoned that the Chinese government’s 96.1% market share “makes it likely
that the government as the predominant supplier has the market power to affect
through its own pricing strategy the pricing by private providers for the same
goods, and induce them to align with government prices.”85 The Appellate
Body also upheld the USDOC’s market-distortion analysis for Chinese loan
subsidies.86

82

Id. at ¶ 90.
In China CFS Paper I&D Memo in 2007, the USDOC refused to use the interest rates for loans made
by private and foreign banks in China as the benchmark for measuring whether Chinese policy banks and
state-owned commercial banks provided loans at below-market interest rates, because “[the Chinese
government]’s intervention in the banking sector creates significant distortions, even restricting and
influencing private and foreign banks within the PRC.” China CFS Paper I&D Memo, supra note 72, at 5. In
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China, the USDOC rejected
Chinese domestic steel prices as the benchmark for determining whether Chinese SOEs sold steel inputs to
downstream producers at below-market prices, because where “the government provides the majority, or a
substantial portion of the market for a good or service, prices for such goods and services in the country will be
considered significantly distorted and will not be an appropriate basis of comparison for determining whether
there is a benefit.” Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., to David
M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Final Determination in the Countervailing Duty
Investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China 64 (May 29,
2008) [hereinafter China CWP I&D Memo] http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E8-12606-1.pdf.(final
determination). Similarly, in Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of China, the USDOC
rejected Chinese domestic land prices as the benchmark for determining whether the Chinese government
granted land-use rights to Chinese producers at below-market prices, because “Chinese land prices are
distorted by the significant government role in the market.” Memorandum from Stephen J. Claeys, Deputy
Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., to David M. Spooner, Assistant Sec’y for Imp. Admin., on the Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Laminated Woven Sacks from the People’s Republic of
China 15 (June 16, 2008) [hereinafter China Sacks I&D Memo], http://ia.ita.doc.gov/frn/summary/PRC/E814256-1.pdf (final determination).
84
See DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶¶ 448–58.
85
Id. at ¶ 455.
86
See id. at ¶¶ 471–90.
83
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In DS437, however, the Appellate Body reversed itself on Chinese input
subsidies. According to the Appellate Body in DS437, the USDOC could not
base its rejection of Chinese domestic prices as the subsidy benchmark merely
on the fact that government-related entities were the predominant suppliers of
the relevant goods.87 The Appellate Body suggested that to find market
distortion, the USDOC needed to explain whether and how government-related
suppliers “possessed and exerted market power such that other in-country
prices were distorted” and whether the prices of “government-related
[suppliers] themselves were market determined.”88
II. THE EXISTING MARKET-VERSUS-STATE TESTS
As discussed above, the modern state interacts with the market in myriad
ways, and the law is often called upon to weigh the legal significances of such
interactions. However, because market-versus-state interactions take place in
markedly different contexts, attempts to arrive at a unified theory of how the
law treats the market-state interaction are all but guaranteed to fail.
That said, one can glean valuable insights into how the law approaches the
market-state interaction by examining the analytical methods employed by the
law in this effort. In this Part, this Article discusses how current law relies on
four tests, based on ownership, control, function, and role, respectively, to
evaluate market-versus-state interactions. Many of these tests, however, reflect
assumptions that have been called into question by changing roles of the state
and more nuanced understandings of the market-versus-state dynamics. The
ensuing discussions examine the four tests and their limitations.
A. Ownership-Based Test
In drawing the boundary between the market and the state, the law has
often used the ownership of the entity that carries out the disputed conduct as
the demarcation line. Under this ownership-based test, the ultimate factor that
would dictate the legal outcome in a specific case is whether the entity that
carries out the conduct is publicly or privately owned.
A subtle form of the ownership-based test is the one used in constitutional
law in cases dealing with local flow-control statutes. In 2007, the Supreme
Court in United Haulers held that certain local flow-control ordinances
87
See Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from
China, ¶ 4.95, WT/DS437/AB/R (adopted Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter DS437 AB Report].
88
Id. at ¶ 4.96.
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requiring waste haulers to bring waste to publicly owned transfer and
processing facilities did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. 89 This
holding stands in stark contrast with the Court’s holding in the earlier case of C
& A Carbone, in which the Court struck down similar flow-control ordinances
as per se discrimination against out-of-state waste haulers.90 The only
difference between United Haulers and C & A Carbone is that the former
involved waste transfer and processing facilities owned by the government
while the latter involved privately owned facilities.91 The Court found this
difference constitutionally significant, holding that “it does not make sense to
regard laws favoring local government and laws favoring private industry with
equal skepticism.”92 According to the Court, laws favoring in-state business
over out-of-state competition are often the product of “simple economic
protectionism,” while “[l]aws favoring local government . . . may be directed
toward any number of legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.”93 The
legality of the local flow-control ordinances, therefore, entirely hinged upon
whether the government owned the facilities in question.
Leaving aside the question of whether discrimination in favor of
government-owned businesses is more likely than discrimination in favor of
private businesses to serve legitimate public interest,94 a fatal flaw of the
ownership-based test is that it is overly formalistic and easily circumventable.
The facility in C & A Carbone was built by a private contractor for the city
free of charge, in return for a guaranteed minimum waste flow for five years
for which it was allowed to charge above-market tipping fees.95 At the end of
the five-year period, the contractor would sell the facility to the city for a
nominal amount—one dollar.96 This arrangement was essentially a way of
financing the cost of constructing the facility, with the private contractor
89

United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth. 550 U.S. 330, 345 (2007).
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392–94 (1994).
91
United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 334.
92
Id. at 343.
93
Id.
94
In his dissenting opinion in United Haulers, Justice Alito argued that laws favoring governmentowned businesses were no less discriminatory than laws favoring private businesses, as they “inur[ed] to the
benefit of local residents who are employed at the facility, local businesses that supply the facility with goods
and services, and local workers employed by such businesses.” Id. at 364 (Alito, J., dissenting). He observed
that “[e]xperience in other countries, where state ownership is more common than it is in this country, teaches
that governments often discriminate in favor of state-owned businesses (by shielding them from international
competition) precisely for the purpose of protecting those who derive economic benefits from those
businesses, including their employees.” Id. “Such discrimination,” according to the Justice, “amounts to
economic protectionism in any realistic sense of the term.” Id.
95
C & A Carbone, 511 U.S. at 387.
96
Id.
90
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paying the construction cost up front and getting reimbursed by the city
through guaranteed higher tipping fees.97 The city could simply take out a loan
and use the loan proceeds to acquire the ownership of the facility from the
contractor.98 With the facility being a government-owned one, the city would
be able to bypass the constitutional restriction erected under C & A Carbone.
The bottom line here is that ownership can be easily purchased and sold. A
legal test whose outcome depends on something as ephemeral as ownership is
inherently arbitrary.
A more overt form of the ownership-based test is often utilized in
international trade law. This ownership-based test treats state-owned
enterprises as public bodies, and their mere presence in the marketplace as
market distorting. In several countervailing duty proceedings involving imports
from China, the USDOC adopted a “majority ownership” rule, under which
any Chinese SOEs that were majority owned by the Chinese government were
considered public bodies for subsidy determination purposes.99 Similarly, the
USDOC equated government ownership with market distortion in its subsidy
benchmark analysis, when it determined that “where . . . the government
provides the majority, or a substantial portion of the market for a good or
service, prices for such goods and services in the country will be considered
significantly distorted and will not be an appropriate basis of comparison for
determining whether there is a benefit.”100
The problem with this overt form of the ownership-based test is that it goes
against a principal tenet of the modern views of the government. At least from
a theoretical perspective, governments could manage SOEs in a hands-off,
commercially oriented manner, and ensure a level-playing field between SOEs
and private businesses in the marketplace.101 Indeed, such even-handed

97

Id. at 393.
The city would presumably have little difficulty obtaining the loan, as it could use the future revenues
of the facility, backed by flow-control ordinances, as collateral for the loan.
99
See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The normal rule followed by the USDOC was to apply a
five-factor test, which inquires about the government ownership of an entity, the government’s presence on the
entity’s board of directors, the government’s control over the entity’s activities, the entity’s pursuit of
governmental policies or interests, and whether the entity is created by statute. See China Light-Walled RPT
I&D Memo, supra note 72, at 27. The USDOC refused to apply the five-factor test to Chinese SOEs on the
grounds that the Chinese government failed to provide sufficient information on factors other than the
government ownership of the SOEs. Id. at 28–30.
100
China CWP I&D Memo, supra note 83.
101
When the U.S. government took over General Motors at the depth of the 2008–2009 financial crisis,
it issued guidelines stating that it would manage General Motors “‘in a hands-off, commercial manner’ and not
get involved in issuing day-to-day directives to GM.” Neil King Jr. et al., Potential Conflicts Abound in
98
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treatment of state-owned businesses is considered highly desirable, and is
promoted as a model for government participation in the economy.102 Equating
government ownership with governmental conduct essentially denies this
theoretical possibility and presumes that the government plays a distorting role
whenever it participates in the economy.
The ownership-based test has been discredited in international trade law. In
DS379, the WTO Appellate Body held that “evidence of government
ownership, in itself, is not evidence of meaningful control of an entity by
government and cannot, without more, serve as a basis for establishing that the
entity is vested with authority to perform a governmental function.”103 The
Appellate Body also rejected “the application of a per se rule, according to
which an investigating authority could properly conclude in every case, and
regardless of any other evidence, that the fact that the government is the
predominant supplier means that private prices are distorted” for the use of
out-of-country benchmarks.104 In DS437, the Appellate Body again stated that
it was inappropriate to infer from the government’s dominant presence in the
market that the market price is distorted.105
B. Control-Based Test
Another market-versus-state test is to equate government control, rather
than government ownership, with governmental conduct. Under this controlbased test, if the government exercises effective control of an entity, then the
entity will be deemed a governmental entity and its conduct will be considered
governmental in nature.
The control-based test has been used primarily in international trade law.
Asked to determine the legality of the USDOC’s majority-ownership rule,
which treated Chinese SOEs as public bodies based on government ownership
alone,106 the WTO dispute settlement panel in DS379 interpreted the term
“public body” in Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement as “any entity
Government Role, WALL ST. J. (June 1, 2009, 11:59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB124381322189670529.
102
See OECD, OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 20
(2015) (recommending that “the legal and regulatory framework for SOEs . . . ensure a level playing field and
fair competition in the marketplace when SOEs undertake economic activities”); OECD, COMPETITIVE
NEUTRALITY: MAINTAINING A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BUSINESSES 29–82
(2012) (advocating competitive neutrality between SOEs and private businesses).
103
DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 346.
104
Id. at ¶ 443.
105
DS437 AB Report, supra note 87, at ¶ 4.95.
106
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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controlled by a government.” 107 In defining government control, the panel
relied on “the everyday financial concept of a ‘controlling interest’ in a
company.”108 What is needed for governments to exercise a controlling interest
is “a maximum of 50 per cent plus one share of the voting stock of a company,
with the possibility that a much smaller voting block can be controlling,
depending on how dispersed the ownership of the remaining shares is, and the
extent to which the other shareholders participate in voting.”109 Government
ownership, according to the panel, is “highly relevant (indeed potentially
dispositive) evidence of government control.”110 The panel thus found “no
legal error . . . in giving primacy to evidence of majority governmentownership.”111
The WTO Appellate Body, however, rejected the DS379 panel’s singular
focus on government control. The Appellate Body acknowledged that
“evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and
its conduct may serve, in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant
entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such authority in the
performance of governmental functions.”112 But, “apart from an express
delegation of authority in a legal instrument, the existence of mere formal links
between an entity and government in the narrow sense is unlikely to suffice to
establish the necessary possession of governmental authority.”113 The
Appellate Body finally concluded that “control of an entity by a government,
in itself, is not sufficient to establish that an entity is a public body.”114
The Appellate Body’s skepticism of government control is well founded. A
control-based market-versus-state test suffers from the same fundamental flaw
as the ownership-based test: it ignores the possibility that a governmentcontrolled entity may carry out market activities in the same manner as a
private entity.115 In other words, even if the government has a controlling
interest in an entity, it may operate the entity in accordance with market

107

DS379 Panel Report, supra note 73, at ¶ 8.94.
Id. at ¶ 8.134.
109
Id. (emphasis omitted).
110
Id.
111
Id. at ¶ 8.136.
112
DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 318.
113
Id. at ¶ 318.
114
Id. at ¶ 320.
115
Presumably, this possibility underlies the need to differentiate the state’s governmental conduct from
its market conduct in the first place.
108
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principles.116 Equating government control with governmental conduct, like
equating government ownership with governmental conduct, wrongly
presumes that all conduct of an entity owned or controlled by the government
is governmental in nature.
Another problem with the control-based test is that the concept of
government control is often elusive, particularly in countries with weak legal
institutions. When the government does not scrupulously observe the boundary
between public and private properties, government control extends beyond
entities in which the government has a controlling interest in the financial
sense.117 Take China, a country with respect to which the market-versus-state
issue often comes up, for example.118 In China, the government could exercise
control over firms in which it holds only a minority ownership interest or even
no ownership interest at all.119 The picture becomes even more blurred when
the concept of control is broadened from control in the financial sense to
control in the residual rights sense, as the Chinese government arguably
exercises ultimate control over all firms, whether state-owned or privately
owned, through extra-legal means.120 But on the other side of the coin,
government control of SOEs in China is diluted because of delegation of
control to SOE executives and capture of state power by SOEs.121 As a result,
“firms in China exhibit substantial similarities” in terms of their practical
relationships with the government, regardless of their formal ownership and
control structures.122 In light of these realities, a control-based test for
distinguishing between the market and the state will unduly strain the
institutional capacity of the authority charged with making that determination.
C. Function-Based Test
Yet another test that has been employed to delineate the boundary between
the market and the state is a function-based test, which considers the state to be
acting in a governmental capacity if and when the state is performing a

116
Again, such market-oriented management is actively promoted as a best practice for state-owned
enterprises. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
117
See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 70, at 685.
118
Note that almost all of the market-versus-state issues in international trade law arise in the context of
China. See supra Sections I.B–C.
119
See MARSHALL W. MEYER & CHANGQI WU, PAULSON INST., MAKING OWNERSHIP MATTER:
PROSPECTS FOR CHINA’S MIXED OWNERSHIP ECONOMY 9 (2014).
120
See Milhaupt & Zheng, supra note 70, at 685.
121
Id. at 676–83.
122
Id. at 669.
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governmental function. As discussed below, this function-based test has
emerged as a frequently used market-versus-state test in multiple areas of law.
In constitutional law, jurists have proposed to use the function-based test to
determine whether states and local government entities should be immune
from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. In Reeves, where the U.S. Supreme
Court used the market-participant exception to uphold South Dakota’s sale of
cement produced by a state-owned plant to state residents only,123 Justice
Powell dissented and rejected the application of the market-participant
exception in this situation.124 According to Justice Powell, while South Dakota
entered the private market for cement as a market participant, the dormant
Commerce Clause still applied because South Dakota’s marketing policy “cut
off interstate trade”125 and “favor[ed] private, in-state customers over out-ofstate customers.”126 The threshold question, Justice Powell argued, was not
whether the state entered the private market per se,127 but “the nature of the
government activity involved.”128 Justice Powell argued for a function-based
test to determine whether the Commerce Clause is implicated: “If a public
enterprise undertakes an integral operatio[n] in areas of traditional
governmental functions, the Commerce Clause is not directly relevant.”129
Following Justice Powell’s initial backing of the function-based test in
Reeves, the test gained wider acceptance in subsequent Commerce Clause
cases. In United Haulers, the Court stated that it was “particularly hesitant” to
use the Commerce Clause to strike down the waste flow-control laws at
dispute because “[w]aste disposal is both typically and traditionally a local
government function.”130 In Davis, the nature of the function performed by the
government was elevated to be the key factor in disposing of Commerce
Clause challenges. Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Souter in
Davis argued that a governmental function is “likely motivate[ed] by
legitimate objectives distinct from . . . simple economic protectionism” to such
123

See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 452–53 (Powell, J., dissenting).
125
Id. at 452.
126
Id.at 452–53.
127
Justice Powell would distinguish the scenario in which the state enters the private market to supply its
own needs from the scenario in which the state enters the private market for the advantage of its private
citizens. In the former scenario, the state may “act without regard to the private marketplace and remove itself
from the reach of the Commerce Clause.” Id. at 450. But in the latter scenario, the state “may not evade the
constitutional policy against economic Balkanization.” Id.
128
Id. at 449.
129
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
130
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 344 (2007)
(alteration in original).
124
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an extent that the standard Commerce Clause does not apply.131 The Court
upheld Kentucky’s tax scheme favoring in-state municipal bonds because “the
issuance of debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public
function.”132
The function-based test has also played a role in deciding whether states
and local government entities should be made subject to federal antitrust law.
In Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass’n v. Abbott Laboratories, the Court
addressed whether pharmacies owned and operated by a state university and a
county hospital should be required to defend antitrust claims under the
Robinson-Patman Act.133 The Court answered the question affirmatively,
holding that the issue before it was not state purchases “for use in traditional
governmental functions.”134 Instead, the issue was “limited to state purchases
for the purpose of competing against private enterprises.”135
Finally, international trade law has also embraced the function-based test
as the preferred test for determining whether an entity is a public body for
subsidy identification purposes. In DS379, after rejecting the control-based test
for public bodies,136 the WTO Appellate Body held that the assessment of
whether an entity is a public body “must focus on evidence relevant to the
question of whether the entity is vested with or exercises government
authority.”137 The panel in DS437 further interpreted the Appellate Body’s
holding in DS379 to mean that “the critical consideration in identifying a
public body is the question of authority to perform governmental functions.”138
While widely used, the function-based test does not withstand scrutiny. As
Justice Alito argued in his dissent in United Haulers, “any standard that turns
on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental function is
‘integral’ or ‘traditional’ is unsound in principle and unworkable in

131
Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 341 (2008). In a footnote, Justice Souter further
argued that the point of the function-based test was “not to draw fine distinctions among governmental
functions, but to find out whether the preference was for the benefit of a government fulfilling governmental
obligations or for the benefit of private interests.” Id. at 341 n.9. This reasoning, however, is rather circular, as
whether a preference is for the benefit of the government obviously depends on the classification of the
governmental function in question.
132
Id. at 341–42.
133
See 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
134
Id. at 153–54.
135
Id. at 154. The Court held that the defendants’ acts at issue, the retail sale of pharmaceutical drugs,
was not “‘indisputably’ an attribute of state sovereignty.” Id. at 154 n.6.
136
See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text.
137
DS379 AB Report, supra note 75, at ¶ 345.
138
DS437 Panel Report, supra note 13, at ¶ 7.66.
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practice.’’139 Whether a function is a traditional governmental one obviously
depends on whether it is traditionally performed by the government. But
traditions evolve over time, rendering the determination of what constitutes
traditional governmental functions not subject to objective criteria. For
example, the governmental function at dispute in United Haulers—waste
disposal—is traditionally performed by local governments, but most of the
waste produced in the United States today is managed by private businesses.140
Some other functions, such as social security and health care, were not
traditionally performed by governments, but became quintessential
governmental functions as governments expanded their roles over time.141 As a
federal district court put it, a traditional governmental function is identified “in
the same way pornography is sometimes identified: someone knows it when
they see it, but they can’t describe it.”142
For these reasons, the Court explicitly abandoned the function-based test in
Garcia, in which the Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards
Act to a municipally owned mass-transit system despite that mass
transportation was considered a traditional governmental function.143 The
Court rejected the historical approach to state immunity because “it prevents a
court from accommodating changes in the historical functions of the States,
changes that have resulted in a number of once-private functions like education
being assumed by the States and their subdivisions.”144 The Court further
rejected nonhistorical standards for selecting immune governmental functions
such as those seeking to identify “uniquely” or “necessary” governmental
functions.145
D. Role-Based Test
Yet another test that has been used to distinguish between the market and
the state is to look at the role the government plays in the market-creation
process. The focus of this test is whether the government created the market in
question in the first place or merely participates in an existing market. This test

139
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 368–69 (2007)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
140
Id. at 369.
141
Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.
ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2017).
142
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth. v. Donovan, 557 F. Supp. 445, 453 (W.D. Tex. 1983).
143
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
144
Id. at 543–44.
145
Id. at 545.
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would give the government special treatment in the former, but not the latter,
scenario.
In constitutional law, a role-based test has been offered as a basis for
absolving states of dormant Commerce Clause violations. In his concurring
opinion in Alexandria Scrap, Justice Stevens argued that Maryland should be
allowed to subsidize in-state businesses—and in-state businesses only—for
recycling abandoned automobiles because the market for recycling abandoned
automobiles was created by the Maryland subsidy program in the first place.146
According to Justice Stevens, the interstate commerce said to be burdened by
the Maryland subsidy program—the movement of abandoned automobiles
from Maryland to out-of-state scrapping plants—“would never have existed if
in the first instance Maryland had decided to confine its subsidy to operators of
Maryland plants.”147 The majority in Alexandria Scrap, however, refused to
adopt Justice Stevens’ reasoning because it found that “the record contain[ed]
no details of the hulk market prior to the bounty scheme.”148 But the majority
in Alexandria Scrap was receptive to the idea that if the government was
indeed the creator of the interstate commerce, it should be able to reduce or
eliminate the commerce without violating the dormant Commerce Clause.149
The role-based test in the Commerce Clause context found a strong
advocate in Professor Laurence Tribe, who attempted to justify the marketparticipant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause on market-creation
grounds.150 Professor Tribe argued that “[t]he principle that necessarily
underlies the market participant-market regulator distinction is that, when the
state is creating commerce that would not otherwise exist, it has greater
freedom to shape that commerce than when it is intruding into a previously
existing private market.”151
A similar role-based test has been adopted in international trade law as
well. In Canada–Renewable Energy/Canada–Feed-In Tariff Program, Japan
and the European Union argued that Ontario’s feed-in-tariff (FIT) program,
146

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815–16 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 815. The subsidy program Maryland implemented in 1969 initially included subsidies for
scrapping plants in Virginia and Pennsylvania. Id.
148
Id. at 809 n.18 (majority opinion). Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Brennan presented evidence from the
record that interstate commerce in abandoned automobiles existed prior to the Maryland subsidy program. Id.
at 824 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149
Id. at 809 n.18 (majority opinion) (“We would hesitate to hold that the Commerce Clause forbids
state action reducing or eliminating a flow of commerce dependent for its existence upon state subsidy instead
of private market forces.”).
150
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 146 (1985).
151
Id.
147
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which offered to purchase electricity from producers of wind power and solar
photovoltaic energy at rates above those accorded to producers of conventional
power, constituted a subsidy within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.152
The Appellate Body rejected this argument, holding that it was unable to
determine whether the FIT program conferred a benefit, an element necessary
for a finding of a subsidy.153 The Appellate Body held that it could not simply
compare the rates offered to renewable energy producers to rates prevailing in
the competitive wholesale electricity market as a whole because the relevant
markets for the benefit analysis should be the separate competitive markets for
wind- and solar-generated electricity.154 To hold otherwise, the Appellate Body
suggested, would mean that the decision by the government to develop
renewable energy would “in and of itself” be considered as conferring a
benefit.155 That outcome would have been insensible because, according to the
Appellate Body, “a distinction should be drawn between, on the one hand,
government interventions that create markets that would otherwise not exist
and, on the other hand, other types of government interventions in support of
certain players in markets that already exist, or to correct market distortions
therein.”156 The Appellate Body further explained that “[w]here a government
creates a market, it cannot be said that the government intervention distorts the
market, as there would not be a market if the government had not created it.”157
The logic of the role-based test appears to be that when the government
creates the market in the first place, it should not be held liable for deviations
from the normal rules of the marketplace. In constitutional law, the normal rule
is non-discrimination against out-of-state residents or businesses.158 In
international trade law, the normal rule is competitive pricing decided by
market forces.159 But when the government is the creator of the market, it can
152

See DS412/DS426 AB Report, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 1.6–1.7.
Id. at ¶ 5.245. The Appellate Body determined that it was unable to complete its analysis because the
record from the panel proceeding below contained insufficient factual findings and uncontested evidence that
would allow it to draw a conclusion. See id.
154
Id. at ¶ 5.178.
155
Id. at ¶ 5.188 (emphasis omitted). If the comparison is between rates offered to renewable energy
producers and rates in the wholesale electricity market, a benefit will necessarily exist because the former are
higher than the latter. See Rajib Pal, Has the Appellate Body’s Decision in Canada—Renewable
Energy/Canada—Feed-in Tariff Program Opened the Door for Production Subsidies?, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L.
125, 126 (2014).
156
DS412/DS426 AB Report, supra note 14, at ¶ 5.188.
157
Id.
158
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987) (“[P]rincipal objects of dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against interstate commerce.”).
159
This norm is embodied in the use of market benchmarks for identifying and measuring subsidies. See
supra Section I.C.
153
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ignore these normal rules because, as the argument goes, the market would not
have existed but for the government’s action.160
The problems with this role-based test are twofold. First, it is not at all
clear how to ascertain whether the government creates the market in the first
place. When the government supplies cement to in-state residents to replace
supply from out-of-state sources, does that constitute the creation of market?161
Professor Tribe believes so, because “lack of supply blocked purchases of
cement by state residents [and] the state lessened the obstacle by providing
additional supply.”162 But the creation of the additional supply creates a market
only in the sense that the commerce between the source of the additional
supply and the buyers would not have existed but for the additional supply.
From the perspective of the pre-existing suppliers, the creation of the
additional supply only means intrusion into a pre-existing market.163
The second problem with the role-based test proves more insurmountable.
Even assuming that it is straightforward to distinguish between creating a new
market and intruding into a pre-existing market, the role-based test is implicitly
predicated upon a judgment that the creation of new markets is more valuable
than adhering to the normal rules of the marketplace.164 The application of the
role-based test would mean that the government’s creation of new markets—
however it is defined and ascertained—is so worthy that it warrants the
rejection of any principles at issue, be it nondiscrimination in constitutional
law or competitive pricing in international trade law. At least in constitutional
law, this judgment goes against court precedent requiring compliance with the
nondiscrimination rule even in interstate commerce created by the
government.165 But even if there is a strong case for the judgment, the case
needs to be made, not merely assumed. Arguing for the moral superiority of
160

TRIBE, supra note 150.
This is the factual set-up in Reeves, where South Dakota restricted the sale of cement produced by a
state-owned cement plant to in-state residents only. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
162
TRIBE, supra note 150.
163
Prior to the construction of the state-owned cement plant, producers outside of South Dakota were
supplying all the cement used in the state and were making substantial profits. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S.
429, 431 n.1 (1980). Professor Dan Coenen argued that while South Dakota satisfied more buyers’ needs at
lower prices by generating an alternative and additional source of supply, the additional supply displaced outof-state sellers in a pre-existing market. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 410–11.
164
In a similar fashion, Professor Coenen asked: “Why . . . does the ‘creation’ of ‘commerce’
necessarily raise a sufficiently powerful equity to justify state discrimination against interstate commerce?”
Coenen, supra note 16, at 411.
165
See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (holding that the State of New York
was not allowed to deny an out-of-state milk distributor license to purchase milk from within the state for
supply to Boston).
161
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market creation is inherently context-specific; it requires case-by-case analysis
of the value of market creation in comparison to the value of the competing
goals. This task could not, by any means, be disposed of through an across-theboard role-based test.
III. TOWARD A POWER-BASED MARKET-VERSUS-STATE TEST
The foregoing analysis outlines four tests, based on ownership, control,
function, and role, respectively, that have been advanced in different areas of
law to distinguish between the market and the state. These market-versus-state
tests, however, suffer serious limitations. They either presume that all conduct
by the government is governmental in nature, as is the case under the
ownership-based and control-based tests.166 Or they base legal outcomes on
factors that do not lend themselves to objective determinations, as is the case
under the function-based and role-based tests.167 Or they are implicitly
predicated on a value judgment that needs support on a case-by-case basis, as
is the case with the role-based test.168
This Part argues that in the search for a reliable market-versus-state test,
one defining characteristic of the government has been ignored: the coercive
power that only the government, as the sovereign, possesses. This Part
proposes a power-based test that draws the boundary between the market and
the state based on whether the state is exercising what could be referred to as
the governmental power, or coercive power to exert control through the
operation of law with no basis in recognized property rights. This
governmental power is distinguishable from another coercive power possessed
by the government, namely, coercive market power by virtue of the
government’s property rights in economic resources. As detailed below, this
power-based test avoids the flaws plaguing other market-versus-state tests
while, above all, capturing the essence of the government.
This Part first discusses the power-based test and how it differs from the
approach in current case law. This Part then argues that the power-based test
should be preceded by an inquiry as to the fundamental purpose of the legal
regime at issue and whether that purpose implicates the distinction between
governmental power and market power. This purpose inquiry is crucial as it
determines whether the power-based test should apply in the first place.

166
167
168

See supra notes 101–02, 115–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–42, 161–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
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A. Governmental Power Versus Market Power
One test that has been ignored by the prevailing market-versus-state
analysis is to look at the nature of the power that is being exercised by the state
in a specific state action. Under this test, if the power is a coercive one backed
by state-sanctioned violence, then the state action will be considered
governmental in nature. If the state only exercises power stemming from its
market position, then it will be considered to be acting in a market or
proprietary capacity.
As sovereigns, governments exercise coercive power over the people they
govern.169 This sovereign coercive power, sometimes referred to as regulatory
power, is the power to exert control through the operation of law with no basis
in recognized property rights.170 One prominent example of this sovereign
coercive power is the government’s power to impose taxes.171 The sovereign
coercive power of the government has animated many legal principles
designed to keep the government in check.172 In a similar vein, the possession
and exercise of sovereign coercive power has been considered the hallmark of
governmental conduct.173
The government’s sovereign coercive power needs to be differentiated
from another kind of coercive power the government possesses: coercive
169
See Town of Graham v. Karpark Corp., 194 F.2d 616, 620–21 (4th Cir. 1952) (“A city has two
classes of powers, the one legislative or governmental, by virtue of which it controls its people as their
sovereign, the other proprietary or business, by means of which it acts and contracts for the private advantage
of the inhabitants of the city and of the city itself.” (quoting Omaha Water Co. v. City of Omaha, 162 F. 225
(8th Cir. 1908))).
170
Nachbar, supra note 44, at 70–73 (distinguishing between regulatory control and property rights).
171
See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1194 (1986) (describing taxation as one of the more coercive
government powers).
172
See, e.g., Free v. Miles, 333 F.3d 550, 554 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (“The limited function of [the
common law rule that a prisoner is entitled to credit for time served when he is incarcerated through no fault of
his own] is to prevent the government from abusing its coercive power to imprison a person by artificially
extending the duration of his sentence through releases and re-incarcerations.”); Flint v. Mullen, 499 F.2d 100,
105 (1st Cir. 1974) (Coffin, C.J., dissenting) (“The safeguards which courts have created around the exercise
of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination are essentially bulwarks against abuse of the
government’s coercive power.”); Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs Ass’n v. Clarke, 513 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022
(E.D. Wis. 2007) (holding that the actions of the county sheriff in inviting representatives of a religious
organization to speak at department leadership conference and roll calls, which police deputies were required
to attend, was an unconstitutional endorsement of religion through use of coercive power of government).
173
In constitutional law, for example, a private actor may be considered to act as an instrument or agent
of the government for purposes of Fourth and Fifth Amendments if “‘the government exercise[s] such coercive
power or such significant encouragement that it is responsible’ for the [private actor’s] conduct.” See United
States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fidelity Fin. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank, 792
F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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power by virtue of the government’s property rights in economic resources.
For example, when the government refuses to hire contractors whose
workforce does not include a sufficient percentage of local residents, the
government is essentially attempting to coerce potential contractors to hire
local workers up to the set percentage.174 But this coercion is backed not by
threats of state-sanctioned violence, but by the government’s willingness to
turn away noncompliant contractors from government projects. To the extent
that the government projects account for a significant share of the projects
available on the market, this willingness to say no on the part of the
government could rise to the level of coercion.175 For the sake of convenience,
this Article will refer to coercion by virtue of the government’s sovereign
power as “government coercion” and coercion by virtue of the government’s
market power as “market coercion.”
Government coercion and market coercion share a major commonality.
From the perspective of the parties being coerced, whether the coercion is a
government one or a market one makes little practical difference. For instance,
when a contractor is compelled to hire 50% of its employees from local
residents, the contractor would not care whether it is compelled by a
government mandate or by the needs to secure government contracts. Professor
Donald Regan argues that government-spending programs are “less coercive
than regulatory programs or taxes with similar purposes,” and therefore, “they
seem to interfere less, or less objectionably, with the ordinary workings of the
market economy.”176 But in terms of the impact on the parties being coerced,
the degree of coerciveness is substantially similar between government
coercion and market coercion.177
Despite their similarities, what sets government coercion apart from market
coercion is that the former could only be exercised by the government, while
the latter could be exercised by both the government and private actors.178 For
174
This is the factual setup presented in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Inc., in which the city of Boston required all city-funded construction projects “be performed by a work force
consisting of at least half bona fide [city] residents.” 460 U.S. 204, 205–06 (1983).
175
Even if the government is just one of many employers on the market, the government’s willingness to
reject noncompliant contractors is still coercive with respect to the specific government projects in question.
176
Regan, supra note 171. Regan put forward this argument as one of the differential treatments of
spending versus regulation or tax under the dormant Commerce Clause. See id.
177
Some may argue that market coercion is not coercion in the true sense because one always has the
choice of foregoing the market opportunity and thus not being coerced. But as Professor Coenen argues, the
same can be said of government coercion, as one always has the choice of not doing business in a specific
jurisdiction. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 415.
178
By definition, private actors could only exercise market coercion by virtue of their property rights in
economic resources, as they are not sovereigns and lack the ability to exercise regulatory power.
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this reason, this Article refers to the power of government coercion as the
“governmental power” and the power to exercise market coercion as the
“market power.” A power-based test takes advantage of this distinction and
draws the boundary between the market and the state by inquiring about the
nature of the power being exercised by the government. Under this powerbased test, the government acts in a governmental capacity if and only if it
exercises the governmental power—power that could not be exercised by
private actors.
The power-based test proposed in this Article differs from the approach in
current case law that distinguishes between the market and the state by
analogizing the government to private actors. This approach, also known as the
“private trader analogy”179 or “private-actor analogy,”180 focuses on whether
the specific state action in question is something that a private actor could or
would have done. In Reeves, for example, Justice Powell in his dissent
suggested that in shutting off cement sales to out-of-state customers, South
Dakota was not really behaving like a private cement producer because it was
responding to “political concerns that likely would be inconsequential to a
private cement producer.”181 Similarly, in Wisconsin Department of Industry,
Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
Wisconsin was “not functioning as a private purchaser” of products when it
prohibited state purchases from repeat labor law violators.182
The problem with the private-actor analogy is that it requires the
government to behave exactly like private actors to be considered acting in a
private capacity.183 But by definition, the government responds to incentives or
considerations distinct from those facing private actors.184 So the private-actor
analogy essentially amounts to a per se rule under which a government action
179
See Treg A. Julander, State Resident Preference Statutes and the Market Participant Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 541, 558 (2002).
180
See Stephanie Landry, Comment, State Immunity from the Dormant Commerce Clause: Extension of
the Market-Participant Doctrine from State Purchase and Sale of Goods and Services to Natural Resources,
25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 515, 523 (1985).
181
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 453 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
182
475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986) (quoting Gould, Inc. v. Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations,
750 F.2d 608, 614 (7th Cir. 1984)).
183
For the government to be considered to be acting in a private capacity under this private actor
analogy, the government could not respond to concerns or factors that would not be taken into account by
private actors. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
184
As a social planner, the government in conducting its affairs necessarily considers factors that go
beyond the realms of consideration of the individual members of the society. See JEAN HINDRIKS & GARETH
D. MYLES, INTERMEDIATE PUBLIC ECONOMICS 425–26 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the difference between the
social planner’s welfare function and the welfare functions of individual members of the society).
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is considered governmental in nature simply because it is being conducted by
the government.185
By contrast, the power-based test proposed in this Article would focus on
the nature of the power being exercised by the government in conducting the
action in question. In Reeves, the power-based test would have treated South
Dakota’s cement sales as a market action, because South Dakota was
exercising the power of deciding to whom it will sell its products186—a power
that every private actor possesses.187 Similarly, in Gould, Wisconsin was
exercising the power of deciding from whom to source its supplies,188 and the
power-based test would have treated the state purchases in question as a
market action despite Wisconsin’s non-market motive in imposing the
purchase restriction.189
This distinction between the power-based test and the prevailing privateactor analogy is crucial. The emphasis of the power-based test is whether a
private actor possesses the power that is being exercised by the government,
not whether a private actor would want to exercise that power. A good
example of this difference can be found in Alexandria Scrap, in which
Maryland exercised its prerogative as a market participant to bid up the price
of abandoned automobiles through subsidies, but limited the availability of the
subsidies to in-state businesses through stricter documentation requirements
for out-of-state businesses.190 The inquiry under the power-based test would be
whether a private actor possesses the same kind of power being exercised by
Maryland—buying products at higher-than-market prices and choosing from
whom to buy the products. The answer to that question is obviously yes. So
although a rational private actor would not have wanted to exercise that power,
the fact that it possesses the power leads to the conclusion that Maryland was
acting in a proprietary or market capacity.191
185
This per se rule is not unlike the ownership- and control-based tests, which treat conduct by entities
owned or controlled by the government as governmental in nature. See supra Sections II.A–B.
186
See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1980).
187
A private actor’s power to choose the party with which to deal is subject to an important limitation
under antitrust law. When the private actor is a dominant firm, it can exercise the right to refuse to deal with a
competitor only if there are legitimate competitive reasons for the refusal. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
188
See Wis. Dep’t of Indus., Labor and Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 283–84 (1986).
189
See id. at 287.
190
See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
191
In Davis, Justice Souter stated that “in Alexandria Scrap, Maryland employed the tools of regulation
to invigorate its participation in the market for automobile hulks.” Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 346 (2008). Justice Souter was mistaken in this conclusion, as Maryland was imposing stricter
documentation requirements for out-of-state businesses in connection with its subsidy spending. The power
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Besides capturing the fundamental distinction between the market and the
state, the power-based test overcomes the weaknesses of the other marketversus-state tests that are based on ownership, control, function, and role. The
power-based test recognizes that the government could act in a market capacity
when it is not exercising government coercion.192 The power-based test is not
susceptible to evolving standards, as it is rooted in the nature of government
power, which does not change over time.193 And it is not implicitly based on a
value judgment that needs to be justified.194 In sum, the power-based test
provides an objective, time-invariant, and value-free way of distinguishing
between the state’s governmental role and market role.
B. A Purpose Inquiry
The power-based test proposed in this Article comes with an important
caveat. Because the state interacts with the market in numerous settings, not all
of which implicate the distinction between governmental power and market
power, the power-based test may not be apposite in all settings where the
market-versus-state distinction is being made. Therefore, the power-based test
needs to be preceded by an inquiry as to the fundamental purpose of the legal
regime at issue and whether that purpose implicates the distinction between
governmental power and market power. Not only is this purpose-inquiry
critical to the application of the power-based test, but it also helps reveal the
meaning and purpose behind the market-versus-state distinction.
The need for a purpose inquiry can be illustrated using constitutional law
as an example. Under the market-participant exception to the dormant
Commerce Clause, the state will be exempted from normal constitutional
discipline if it is acting in a proprietary capacity.195 But the question is why.
Answering this question requires an analysis of the fundamental purpose of the
dormant Commerce Clause. As Professors Michael Wells and Walter
Hellerstein argue, “[I]f economic Balkanization is the evil that the commerce
clause was designed to prevent, what difference does it make whether the evil
exercised by Maryland was not regulatory in nature, as a private actor looking to purchase products at higherthan-market prices also has the power to impose stricter documentation requirements on potential sellers.
192
Failure to recognize this possibility is the main problem with the ownership- and control-based tests.
See supra Sections II.A–B.
193
By contrast, the standard for the function-based test is ever-changing depending on the prevailing
conceptions of the government’s functions. See supra Section II.C.
194
Unlike the role-based test, which is based on an implicit value judgment that market creation trumps
the statutory goals in question, the power-based test does not judge the relative values of the different kinds of
government power. For discussions of the value dependency of the role-based test, see supra Section II.D.
195
See supra section I.A.1.
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is brought about by states acting in their governmental or proprietary
capacities?”196 But if the Commerce Clause is intended to address only the ills
brought about by government coercion through the exercise of the
government’s regulatory power, then the distinction between the state’s
governmental and proprietary capacities will become constitutionally
meaningful.197
This analytical framework—the power-based test preceded by a purpose
inquiry—can be applied to any legal regimes that raise market-versus-state
issues. In antitrust law, for example, the application of this analytical
framework turns the debate on whether there should be a market-participant
exception to the state-action immunity into a question about the purpose of the
state-action immunity. Is the purpose of the immunity to take cognizance of
federalism concerns arising from the states’ exercise of regulatory power
only,198 or is it to make federal antitrust law yield to all conduct by states, in
both governmental and proprietary capacities? The answer to this question is of
utmost importance to discerning the scope of the state-action immunity.199
For some legal regimes, the purpose inquiry may lead to the conclusion
that both governmental power and market power are implicated. As explained
below, this is the case in international trade law, which restricts governments’
ability to confer subsidies in both governmental and proprietary capacities.200
The market-state distinction, however, may still be relevant to such legal
regimes if different legal standards apply to the different roles of the
government. In that case, the power-based test can be used to determine in
what role the government acts and consequently what legal standard applies.
IV. APPLYING THE POWER-BASED MARKET-VERSUS-STATE TEST
The power-based test, coupled with an inquiry as to the purpose of the
underlying legal regime in relation to state power, yields valuable insights into
the market-versus-state distinction. As detailed below, this analytical
framework not only distinguishes the market and the state, but also answers the
question of why there needs to be a market-versus-state distinction in the first

196

Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 1125.
For further discussions of the purpose of the Commerce Clause, see infra Section IV.A.
198
John F. Hart, “Sovereign” State Policy and State Action Antitrust Immunity, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
535, 536 (1988).
199
For more discussions of the purpose of the state-action immunity in antitrust law, see infra Section
IV.B.
200
See infra Section IV.C.
197
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place. The application of the power-based test sheds light on thorny marketversus-state issues in constitutional law, antitrust law, and international trade
law.
A. Constitutional Law
Despite the Supreme Court’s insistence on a state-versus-market distinction
for dormant Commerce Clause purposes, scholars have questioned the validity
of such distinction. Professors Wells and Hellerstein, for example, argue that
the state-versus-market distinction has no legitimate place in dormant
Commerce Clause inquiries because the state’s market activities result in the
same economic Balkanization as do the state’s governmental activities.201
Other scholars also reject prevailing justifications for the market-participant
exception on numerous policy grounds.202
Under the power-based test, it becomes clear that different
conceptualizations of the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause motivate
the different approaches to the market-participant exception to the clause. In
Alexandria Scrap, the district court adopted an expansive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause, based on the premise that “this Nation is a common market
in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw
materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and
demand.”203 Under this interpretation, any state actions that inhibit the national
common market are within the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause,
regardless of whether the states inhibit the national common market through
governmental power or market power.204 Rejecting the district court’s
reasoning, the Supreme Court in Alexandria Scrap narrowed the reach of the
dormant Commerce Clause to include only state interference with “the natural
functioning of the interstate market either through prohibition or through
burdensome regulation.”205 In other words, according to the Court, only when
the states are exercising government coercion will the dormant Commerce
Clause be implicated. Based on this narrower interpretation of the dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court in Alexandria Scrap went on to recognize a
201

See Wells & Hellerstein, supra note 16, at 1125–26.
See, e.g., Karl Manheim, New-Age Federalism and the Market Participant Doctrine, 22 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 559, 582–601 (1990); Jonathan D. Varat, State “Citizenship” and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV.
487, 505–07 (1981).
203
See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976).
204
Id. at 805 (“This line of reasoning is not without force if its basic premise is accepted. That premise is
that every action by a State that has the effect of reducing in some manner the flow of goods in interstate
commerce is potentially an impermissible burden.”).
205
Id. at 806.
202
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market-participant exception. Similarly, in Reeves, the Court stated that “the
Commerce Clause responds principally to state taxes and regulatory measures
impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. There is no indication
of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to operate
freely in the free market.”206
If the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause is to only reign in
governmental power, then whether the state exercises that power in the specific
action at issue becomes the ultimate factor in determining whether the dormant
Commerce Clause applies. In other words, when the state exercises market
power and market power only, it acts in a proprietary capacity and will be out
of the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause.
This insight would inject much-needed logic into the case law on the
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause. In Alexandria
Scrap, Maryland was exercising the power of spending money to subsidize the
recycling of abandoned automobiles.207 Although Maryland imposed a
documentation requirement on the subsidy recipients, that requirement was a
condition for receiving the subsidies, something in which the state had
property rights.208 So at most Maryland was exercising market power, a power
that private actors possess.209 In Reeves, South Dakota was exercising the
power of choosing to whom to sell its products, a quintessential private
power.210 Similarly, in White, the City of Boston was exercising market power,
not governmental power, when it required contractors to hire at least 50% of
their labor force from local residents before they were allowed to work on cityfunded projects.211 The Court correctly held, therefore, that the government in
all these cases qualified for the market-participant exception.
The power-based test does indicate that the Court was wrong in not
applying the market-participant exception in Wunnicke, where Alaska required
that timber taken from state lands be processed within the state prior to
export.212 The Court declined to apply the market-participant exception to the
206

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436–37 (1980) (internal citation omitted).
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 797.
208
Id. at 798.
209
Although a private actor would not want to give out money for free to encourage the recycling of
abandoned automobiles, it does have the power to do so and to impose documentation requirements as a
condition.
210
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 432–33.
211
See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp’rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983). The City of Boston would
have exercised the power of government coercion had it required all businesses, not just businesses working on
city-funded projects, to hire at least 50% of their labor force from local residents.
212
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 84 (1984).
207
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Alaska requirement because it was a downstream restriction with regulatory
effects.213 The Court stated that “[t]he limit of the market-participant doctrine
must be that it allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the
market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further.”214 Viewed in
light of the power-based test, this characterization of the market-participant
exception is both overly broad and overly narrow. It is overly broad because
the market-participant exception does not always allow a state to impose
burdens on commerce within the market in which it is a participant—it only
allows a state to impose burdens that could be imposed by private actors.215 It
is overly narrow because when a state exercises market power only, it is
accorded the market-participant status even if the restriction extends beyond
the immediate market in which the state is a participant. This was the case in
White, in which the Court upheld the City of Boston’s labor force requirement
for government contractors despite the fact that the city itself was not a
participant in the labor market at issue.216
The power-based test would point to a different outcome in Wunnicke,
because Alaska in that case was merely imposing a restriction on the
processing of timber taken from state-owned lands in which Alaska had
property rights. 217 In so doing, Alaska was exercising a power possessed by
private actors, who could impose similar processing requirements for timber
taken from their own lands. The power-based test, therefore, would exempt the
Alaska requirement from scrutiny under the dormant Commerce Clause.
The power-based test would also help solve another puzzle in the dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Under current case law, while the Court
draws a distinction between impermissible market regulation and permissible
market participation,218 it has not delineated a clear boundary between the two.
For instance, the Court treats tax credits and exemptions as market regulation

213

Id. at 99.
Id. at 97.
215
In United Haulers, for example, the government imposed restrictions with regulatory effects in the
market in which it was a participant—the waste transfer and processing market. See United Haulers Ass’n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 334 (2007).
216
White, 460 U.S. at 205–06. The city was a participant in the market for construction projects, not in
the labor market for workers who would work on those projects.
217
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 84.
218
See, e.g., id. at 93 (plurality opinion) (“Our cases make clear that if a State is acting as a market
participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its
activities.”).
214
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on the grounds that taxation is inherently governmental.219 But it fails to
explain why subsidies, which it upholds as market participation under the
market-participant rule,220 are any less governmental than taxation.221
Commentators offered several justifications for the more relaxed treatment of
subsidies under the dormant Commerce Clause on the basis of policy and
history.222 One difference noted by commentators between taxation and
subsidies is that the latter is relatively expensive, making it less likely to cause
serious damage to the economy.223 Another frequently made argument is that
the “conscious funding” required of subsidies operates as a check against their
proliferation.224 Commentators also resorted to formalism and tradition as
explanations.225 But however convincing these justifications might be,226 they
have no bearings on the question of why the state is a market regulator with
respect to taxation, but a market participant with respect to subsidies.227
The power-based test provides a straightforward justification for the
differential treatment of taxation and subsidies under the dormant Commerce
Clause. In Limbach, the Court held that Ohio was not acting as a market
participant when it provided tax credit to ethanol producers from Ohio or from
219
See, e.g., New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988) (“The market-participant
doctrine has no application here. The Ohio action ultimately at issue is neither its purchase nor its sale of
ethanol, but its assessment and computation of taxes—a primeval governmental activity.”).
220
Recall that Alexandria Scrap involved a state subsidy program. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text.
221
Government spending on economic and social programs accounts for a large percentage of the
government’s activities. The U.S. federal government, for example, spends almost half of its budget on the socalled entitlement programs, including Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare. See ROMINA BOCCIA,
HERITAGE FOUND., FEDERAL SPENDING BY THE NUMBERS, 2014: GOVERNMENT SPENDING TRENDS IN
GRAPHICS, TABLES, AND KEY POINTS (INCLUDING 51 EXAMPLES OF GOVERNMENT WASTE) (2014). One
economist has referred to government spending in the form of subsidies one of the “three major sets of
measures” by which the government “alter[s] the distribution of income.” MILTON H. SPENCER,
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 72 (2d ed. 1974).
222
See Coenen, supra note 16, at 479–81; Collins, supra note 25, at 98–103; Enrich, supra note 16, at
442–43; Gergen, supra note 16, at 1134–53; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 846–48; Paul S. Kline,
Publicly-Owned Landfills and Local Preferences: A Study of the Market Participant Doctrine, 96 DICK. L.
REV. 331, 370–91 (1992); Regan, supra note 171, at 1193–95.
223
See Regan, supra note 171; see also Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 16, at 846–47.
224
Saul Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 585 (1983); see
also Coenen, supra note 16, at 479; Collins, supra note 25, at 102–03; Enrich, supra note 16, at 442–43; Kline,
supra note 222, at 374.
225
See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965,
980–81 (1998); Coenen, supra note 16, at 480; Gergen, supra note 16, at 1136–37.
226
Commentators have questioned some of those justifications. For instance, Coenen argues that it is
debatable whether subsidy programs are inherently more expensive than discriminatory state regulatory and
tax programs. See Coenen, supra note 16, at 434.
227
These justifications either do not address the market-participation question at all, or just circle back to
the argument that taxation is inherently governmental. See Enrich, supra note 16, at 442.
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states that granted reciprocal tax credit, exemption, or refund for Ohioproduced ethanol.228 The Court reasoned that the state action at issue was the
“assessment and computation of taxes—a primeval governmental activity.”229
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court held that
Maine was not engaging in a proprietary activity when it provided property tax
exemptions only to charities that catered principally to state residents, on
grounds that “[a] tax exemption is not the sort of direct state involvement in
the market that falls within the market-participation doctrine.”230 In neither
case, however, did the Court specify why state actions involving taxation are
inherently governmental. The power-based test supplies the missing rationale.
Taxation is inherently governmental because it entails the exercise of
governmental power, a power that no private actors possess. Seen in this light,
state actions involving taxation are governmental in nature and should not be
eligible for the market-participant exception.231
By contrast, when the state gives subsidies, it exercises a power that every
private actor possesses: giving out money for free without receiving things of
228

New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271, 277 (1988).
Id. at 277.
230
520 U.S. 564, 593 (1997).
231
There is a potential fault line in the Court’s treatment of taxation cases. While the Court in Limbach
and Camps Newfound/Owatonna struck down the discriminatory tax credit or exemption at issue as violations
of the dormant Commerce Clause, it upheld, in Davis, a Kentucky tax scheme in which the state exempted
interest income on state municipal bonds, but not interest income on out-of-state municipal bonds, from state
income taxes. See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 333–34, 341–42 (2008). The nature of the
power exercised by the government in Davis, however, was arguably indistinguishable from the nature of
power exercised by the government in Limbach and Camps Newfound/Owatonna. So although Kentucky could
be said to be participating in the market for municipal bonds by making in-state municipal bonds more
attractive, the fact that it was exercising the power of government coercion makes it clear that it was acting in a
governmental capacity. The power-based test, therefore, would squarely place the state action in Davis subject
to the dormant Commerce Clause.
To the extent that Davis needs to be distinguished from Limbach and Camp Newfounds/Owatonna,
such distinctions need to come from elsewhere. One likely basis on which Davis could be distinguished from
Limbach and Camp Newfounds/Owatonna is that in Davis, the ultimate beneficiary of the state action was the
state itself, while in Limbach and Camp Newfounds/Owatonna, the ultimate beneficiaries of the state actions
were individuals or entities other than the state. In Davis, the ultimate beneficiary of the state action was the
state itself because the discriminatory tax exemption made it easier for the political subdivisions of the state to
issue bonds. In Limbach, the ultimate beneficiaries of the state action were all those who would benefit from
the local production of ethanol—farmers, distributors, and suppliers, etc. In Camp Newfounds/Owatonna, the
ultimate beneficiaries of the state action were all residents who would stand to benefit from the services
provided by the charities eligible for the tax exemption. It could be argued that when the ultimate beneficiary
of the state action is the state itself, it does not raise the same level of concerns about discrimination as when
the ultimate beneficiary of the state action is someone other than the state. Note that this distinction is not
based on the government ownership or control of the ultimate beneficiary of the state action and thus can avoid
the problems associated with the ownership- and control-based tests. For discussions of the ownership- and
control-based tests, see supra Sections II.A–B.
229
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equal value in return.232 The only case in which the Court struck down a state
subsidy program was West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, in which
Massachusetts imposed a tax on fluid milk sold by dealers to Massachusetts
retailers and distributed the assessment to Massachusetts dairy farmers.233 The
Court held that the Massachusetts program unconstitutionally discriminated
against interstate commerce even though the two components of the
program—the subsidy component and the tax component—would be valid
separately.234 It was the coupling of a subsidy with a simultaneously enacted
tax, according to the Court, that raised constitutional difficulties.235 Viewed
against the backdrop of the power-based test, the Court’s objection to an
otherwise legal subsidy scheme in West Lynn makes perfect sense, as the state
was exercising governmental power as well as market power. It was the
coupling of the two powers that sets West Lynn apart from other subsidy
cases.236
The power-based test also elucidates another line of cases involving local
flow-control ordinances. In C & A Carbone and United Haulers, the Court was
confronted with the question of whether flow-control ordinances requiring
waste haulers to bring waste to designated waste transfer and processing
facilities violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The Court answered yes in C
& A Carbone but no in United Haulers, with the only difference between the
two cases being that the designated facility was privately owned in the former
case but publicly owned in the latter.237 It is abundantly clear, however, that
the government was exercising governmental power in both cases, as the
government was mandating the disposal of waste in which it had no property
rights.238 And as previously discussed, the government ownership of the waste

232
A private business, for example, could decide to subsidize a particular group of customers using
revenues collected from other customers. Turbotax, the popular tax software, charges $0 for customers who
file the most basic tax returns but $54.99–$114.99 for customers who file more complicated returns. See
Compare Turbotax Online Products, TURBOTAX, https://turbotax.intuit.com/personal-taxes/compare/online/
(last visited Aug. 23, 2017).
233
512 U.S. 186, 188 (1994).
234
Id. at 198–202.
235
Id. at 200–01.
236
The coupling of governmental and market power of spending money takes West Lynn out of the
realm of the market-participant exception. The Court in West Lynn could have brought more consistency to the
case law by explicitly noting that the market-participant exception did not apply, rather than being silent about
the market-participant exception at all. For discussions of the Court’s inconsistency in using the marketparticipant exception as the framework for analyzing dormant Commerce Clause issues, see supra Section
II.A.1.
237
For discussions of C & A Carbone and United Haulers, see supra Section II.A.1.
238
In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis, Justice Souter suggested that United Haulers “may
also be seen under the broader rubric of the market participant doctrine.” 553 U.S. 328, 343 (2008) (plurality
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transfer and processing facilities at issue in C & A Carbone and United
Haulers was a rather fictitious way of distinguishing the two cases.239 The
power-based test, therefore, would demand equal treatment of the flow-control
ordinances in those two cases.
B. Antitrust Law
In antitrust law, complex market-versus-state issues revolve not so much
around how to draw the market-versus-state distinction as around whether the
market-versus-state distinction is relevant at all. In cases involving the stateaction immunity doctrine, it is relatively clear whether the state was acting in a
regulatory capacity or a proprietary capacity. In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, for example, the action being challenged was the defendant city’s
monopoly over the provision of sewage treatment services and its attempt to tie
the provision of such services to the provision of sewage collection and
transportation services.240 In Federal Trade Commission v. Phoebe Putney
Health System, Inc., for another example, the action being challenged was the
defendant hospital authority’s acquisition of another hospital.241 In both cases,
the defendants were engaged in market activities that were otherwise
indistinguishable from conduct by private businesses. By contrast, in North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission, the
action being challenged was the issuing of cease-and-desist letters by the North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners to non-dentist teeth whitening
service providers.242 It is obvious that in issuing the letters, the board was
exercising governmental power, as no private actors possess the power to force

opinion). According to Justice Souter, the fact that the state simultaneously exercises regulatory power while
participating in market activities does not make the market-participant rule inapposite; the dispositive factor is
the government’s market activities. Id. at 346 (“Not only did the public authority acting in [United Haulers]
process trash, but its governmental superiors forbade trash haulers to deal with any other processors. This latter
fact did not determine the outcome, however; the dispositive fact was the government’s own activity in
processing trash.”). Justice Souter would have upheld the flow-control ordinances at issue in United Haulers
under the market-participant exception because the counties in that case participated in the market for trash
processing. Id. at 346–47 (“We upheld the government’s decision to shut down the old market for trash
processing only because it created a new one all by itself, and thereby became a participant in a market with
just one supplier of a necessary service.”). Justice Souter also characterized two other market-participant cases,
Alexandria Scrap and White, as examples of the government’s commercial activities being joined by its
regulatory efforts. Id. at 345–46. But obviously, Justice Souter’s expansive view of the market-participant
exception was not shared by the rest of the majority.
239
See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.
240
471 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1985).
241
568 U.S. 216, 222 (2013).
242
135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108–09 (2015).
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other private actors to stop providing services that they are legally entitled to
provide.243
While it is relatively straightforward to distinguish between the market and
the state in the antitrust context, the market-versus-state distinction has not
really mattered much under current case law. Under the state-action immunity
doctrine, what matters is whether the action at issue reflects the state’s policy,
regardless of the capacity in which the state carries out the action.244 So even if
the state acts in a proprietary capacity, as in Phoebe Putney, as long as the
action is clearly articulated by state policy and actively supervised by the state,
it would be eligible for the state-action immunity.245
But had there been a market-participant exception to the state-action
immunity, it would have mattered whether the state acts in a governmental or
proprietary capacity. Under such an exception, when the state acts in a
proprietary capacity, the state will be subject to antitrust scrutiny regardless of
whether it authorizes the action. In Phoebe Putney, an amicus curiae argued
that the Court should recognize such an exception, although its argument was
based, erroneously, on the notion that the state’s commercial activities are not
a traditional government function.246 The Court, however, declined to take up
this question, because it “was not raised by the parties or passed on by the
lower courts.”247
Should there be a market-participant exception to the state-action immunity
in antitrust law? While the Court has not explicitly endorsed a marketparticipant exception, its holding in Abbott Laboratories provides some
support for such an exception.248 In that case, plaintiff pharmacies sued
defendant state university and county hospital pharmacies for inducing
243
Whether the board was exercising the power of government coercion is a question separate from
whether the board was a governmental body. Even if the board was a private body, that distinction does not
prevent the conclusion that it was exercising governmental power.
244
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
245
In Phoebe Putney, the Court denied state-action immunity to the defendant on the basis that there was
not a sufficient articulation of state policy to authorize the anticompetitive conduct. 568 U.S. at 228.
246
See Brief for National Federation of Independent Business as Amicus Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 6–24, Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. 216 (No. 11-1160). The amicus curiae argued that applying stateaction immunity to the state’s commercial conduct would exceed the state-action immunity doctrine’s purpose
because “[m]arket-participant state conduct is not an ‘integral operation in an area of traditional government
functions.’” Id. at 15 (quoting City of Lafayette v. La. Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 424 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring)). This argument resembles the function-based test that distinguishes between the regulatory
and market roles of the state based on whether the function at issue is a traditional government function. See
supra Section II.C.
247
See Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 226 n.4.
248
Jefferson Cty. Pharm. Ass’n v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150 (1983).
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pharmaceutical manufacturers to sell their products to the defendants at prices
lower than those charged to the plaintiffs in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act.249 The defendants sought to dismiss the case “on the ground that state
purchases are exempt [from the Robinson-Patman Act] as a matter of law.”250
The Court rejected this argument, holding that “the exemption does not apply
where a State has chosen to compete in the private retail market.”251 The Court
observed that “[o]n numerous occasions, this Court has affirmed the
comprehensive coverage of the antitrust laws and has recognized that these
laws represent ‘a carefully studied attempt to bring within [them] every person
engaged in business whose activities might restrain or monopolize commercial
intercourse among the states.’”252 It is unclear, however, whether this sweeping
statement implies a general market-participant exception to state-action
immunity, given that the Court in this case predicated its holding on its
analysis of the text and legislative history of the specific statute at dispute, the
Robinson-Patman Act.253
In another case, City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the
Court also sent mixed signals on the market-participant exception to the stateaction immunity.254 In that case, the Court addressed whether defendant cities
that owned and operated electric utility systems should be allowed to dismiss
antitrust counterclaims filed against them simply by reason of their status as
state agencies or subdivisions of a state.255 On one hand, the Court rejected
defendants’ argument that “the antitrust laws are intended to protect the public
only from abuses of private power and not from actions of municipalities that
exist to serve the public weal.”256 Instead, the Court stated that “the economic
249
Id. at 151–52. The Robinson-Patman Act provides: “It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality . . . where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such
discrimination, or with customers of either of them . . . .” Id. at 152 n.1 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982)).
250
Id. at 153.
251
Id. at 154.
252
Id. at 157. The Court held that the term “person” used in the Robinson-Patman Act is sufficiently
broad to cover governmental bodies. Id. at 155.
253
The Court concluded that “the plain language of the [Robinson-Patman] Act strongly suggests that
there is no exemption for state purchases to compete with private enterprise.” Id. at 156–57. The Court then
found that “[t]he legislative history [of the Robinson-Patman Act] falls far short of supporting respondents’
contention that there is an exemption for state purchases of ‘commodities’ for ‘resale.’” Id. at 159.
254
435 U.S. 389 (1978).
255
Id. at 392. The counterclaims alleged that, among other things, one of the defendant cities contracted
to provide gas and water service to the plaintiff’s electric customers only on the condition that the customers
purchase electricity from the city. Id. at 403–04.
256
Id. at 403.
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choices made by public corporations in the conduct of their business affairs . . .
are not inherently more likely to comport with the broader interests of national
economic well-being than are those of private corporations.”257 But on the
other hand, the Court went on to hold that “the fact that municipalities, simply
by their status as such, are not within the Parker doctrine, does not necessarily
mean that all of their anticompetitive activities are subject to antitrust
restraints.”258 According to the Court, municipalities are still eligible for
immunity from antitrust laws if their activities are directed by the state.259
Therefore, despite its assertion of the broad coverage of antitrust laws, the
Court in City of Lafayette indeed implied that antitrust laws did not apply to
the state’s actions as a market participant.260
The power-based market-versus-state test would bring clarity to the debate
on whether there should be a market-participant exception to the state-action
immunity. Under the power-based test, whether a state’s proprietary activities
should be outside of the purview of a specific legal regime depends on whether
the legal regime is implicated only when the state exercises governmental
power. In the context of the state-action immunity, this inquiry questions the
fundamental purpose of this immunity.
It is a near consensus that the state-action immunity is based on the concept
of federalism.261 Federalism promotes “citizen participation in government,
efficiency in government, creative experimentation, and diffusion of power.”262
The Court’s willingness to defer to “a dual system of government in which . . .
the states are sovereign” forms the basis of the state-action immunity.263 But
the question is whether federalism concerns arise to the same degree when a
state is exercising governmental power and when it is exercising market

257

Id.
Id. at 413.
259
Id. at 416. The Court agreed with the lower court that further inquiries should be made to determine
whether the defendants’ actions were directed by the state. See id. at 413–15.
260
Recall that the defendant cities’ actions at issue in City of Lafayette were commercial in nature. See
supra note 255 and accompanying text.
261
See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust State-Action
Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L.
REV. 1203, 1250–71 (1997) (examining the antitrust state-action doctrine from the perspective of federalism);
Jorde, supra note 16, at 230 (arguing that the Parker Court grounded the state action doctrine and its own
judicial restraint on the structure of economic federalism); William H. Page, Antitrust, Federalism, and the
Regulatory Process: A Reconstruction and Critique of the State Action Exemption After Midcal Aluminum, 61
B.U. L. Rev. 1099, 1105 (1981) (“[T]he Parker Court did not base its construction of the Sherman Act on
legislative history, but instead derived a presumption of congressional intent from the concept of federalism.”).
262
Jorde, supra note 16, at 230–31.
263
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
258
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power. In other words, the question is whether the nature of the power being
exercised by the state is relevant to the value of federalism.
While this question has no easy answers, the weight of the arguments tilts
in favor of no market-participant exception to the state-action immunity. It
could certainly be argued that when a state exercises market power, its
prerogatives as a sovereign are not compromised by the application of federal
antitrust law to the same degree as when it exercises governmental power. But
no matter whether a state exercises governmental or market power, deference
to state actions serves the same goals of federalism, namely promoting citizen
participation, efficiency in government, creative experimentation, and
diffusion of power.264 Furthermore, as Professor Coenen argued, restrictions on
the state’s exercise of market activities are a greater intrusion into state
sovereignty than are restrictions on the state’s regulatory activities, as “state
resources are the state’s ‘own’ in a way that the state’s regulatory powers are
not.”265 The power-based test, therefore, would support shielding states’
market or proprietary activities from federal antitrust law.
C. International Trade Law
Applying the power-based test to international trade law reveals that
international trade law regulates both governmental power and market power.
As discussed below, this conclusion is dictated by the purpose of international
trade law in general and international subsidy law in particular.
A core principle of international trade law is the “liberal economic
doctrine,” which recognizes the benefits of free trade to all countries
participating in international trade.266 Consistent with this principle, the
primary purpose of the GATT and the WTO is to dismantle barriers to trade.267
As a general matter, international trade law seeks to reduce or eliminate trade
barriers that arise from both the regulatory and market conduct of the states. A
typical trade barrier erected by the states in their regulatory capacities is

264
For instance, it could be argued that when citizens of a state authorize an SOE to engage in
anticompetitive conduct, they are participating in government to the same degree as when they impose
coercive requirements. It could also be argued that they are addressing the special needs of the local
population, thereby promoting government efficiency. And such participation equally promotes policy
experimentation and diffusion of power.
265
See Coenen, supra note 16, at 427.
266
Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 NW. J.
INT’L L. & BUS. 775, 781 (1997).
267
Id. at 780; see also JAN HOOGMARTENS, EC TRADE LAW FOLLOWING CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE
WTO 10 (2004).

ZHENG GALLEYPROOFS

290

11/28/2017 12:14 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:243

tariffs,268 which the GATT and the WTO have successfully reduced over the
years.269 International trade law also imposes disciplines on the states when
they undertake market activities through “state trading enterprises.”270 The
states are required, among other things, to operate such enterprises in
accordance with commercial considerations.271 These disciplines on the states’
market activities are based on the understanding that the states may operate
such businesses “so as to create serious obstacles to trade.”272
That international trade law is concerned about the states’ market conduct
can also be seen in the very existence of international subsidy law. As
previously discussed, the conferral of subsidies generally involves no
governmental power; any private actors could give out money without
receiving a quid pro quo.273 In legal regimes that are intended to only curb the
state’s exercise of governmental power—the dormant Commerce Clause under
constitutional law, for example274—the granting of subsidies by the states
poses no threats to the goal of the legal regimes. That explains why state
actions involving subsidies are generally exempted from scrutiny in such legal
regimes.275 The fact that strict subsidy rules exist under international trade law
indicates a fundamental difference between the purpose of international trade
law and that of constitutional law.
Although international trade law implicates both governmental power and
market power, it still makes a distinction between the market and the state. In
international subsidy law, an important question is when an entity owned or

268
Tariffs are akin to taxes in that their imposition requires the power of government coercion, as no
private actors possess the power to collect money without providing goods or services of equivalent values.
269
Average tariffs in industrial countries plummeted from 40% in 1947, when the GATT entered into
force, to 6.3% in 1994 just prior to the entry into force of the Uruguay Round agreements, and further to 3.9%
as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements that led to the establishment of the WTO. See Raj Bhala,
Rethinking Antidumping Law, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1995).
270
GATT 1994, supra note 66, at art. XVII.
271
Article XVII of GATT 1994 requires: “[S]uch enterprises shall, having due regard to the other
provisions of this Agreement, make any such purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial
considerations, including price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of
purchase or sale, and shall afford the enterprises of the other contracting parties adequate opportunity, in
accordance with customary business practice, to compete for participation in such purchases or sales.” Id. at
art. XVII:1(b).
272
Id. at art. XVII:3.
273
See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
274
For a discussion of the purpose of the dormant Commerce Clause, see supra Section IV.A.
275
The only exception is when the granting of subsidies involves the power of government coercion, in
which case the subsidy-granting action will be made subject to the discipline of the state’s regulatory actions.
See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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controlled by the state is a “public body.”276 This question matters because the
legal rules for identifying a countervailable subsidy differ depending on
whether the entity in question is a public or private body.277 As discussed
above, the WTO experimented with ownership-based and control-based
definitions of public bodies before settling on a function-based definition.278
According to the WTO dispute settlement panel in DS437, “the critical
consideration in identifying a public body is the question of authority to
perform governmental functions.”279 This definition, however, begs the
question of what constitutes a governmental function.280 The logic of the
power-based test points to a straightforward answer to this question. Under the
power-based test, a public body should be defined as an entity that possesses
and exercises governmental power. So when an SOE is allegedly providing a
subsidy, whether the SOE should be deemed a public body will depend on
whether the SOE is equipped with coercive power with no basis in recognized
property rights.281 This power-based definition would avoid the problems
associated with other definitions based on ownership, control, function, or role.
CONCLUSION
What is the boundary between the market and the state? The prevailing
approaches focus on the government’s ownership, control, function, or role to
answer this question. This Article challenges these approaches and proposes an
alternative market-versus-state test that focuses on the nature of the power
being exercised in the challenged action. This power-based test captures the
essence of governmental conduct and, when coupled with inquiries as to the
fundamental purpose of the legal regime at issue, sheds light on the more
important question of why the market-versus-state distinction matters at all.
The insights from the power-based test lay the foundation for a coherent
methodology for tackling complex legal issues surrounding the market-versusstate distinction.

276

For a background discussion on the “public body” issue, see supra Section I.B.3.
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
278
See supra Sections II.A–C.
279
DS437 Panel Report, supra note 13, at ¶ 7.66.
280
For more discussion of the problems with the function-based definition of public bodies, see supra
Section II.C.
281
In DS437, China argued that “[a] public body, like government in the narrow sense, thus must itself
possess the authority to ‘regulate, control, supervise or restrain’ the conduct of others.” DS437 Panel Report,
supra note 13, at ¶ 7.67 (alteration in original). The panel, however, rejected this argument on textual grounds.
Id. at ¶ 7.68.
277

